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1. INTRODUCTION
Entropy is a measure of information and uncertainty which has been used re-
cently in diﬀerent areas, besides of its original utilization in physics, creating a new
research area: Econophysics. Econophysics is the application of physical methods
with the objective of solve economic problems and had started precisely with the
study of financial markets. In the last years, the number of works using entropy in
economic analysis increased, because of it interest and also for similarities between
both research areas, although that relationship is not such evident, in a first view.
For example, Candeal et al. (2001) show in their work that exists a great similarity
between the theory of entropy and utility.
There are several examples that show the analogies between physics and eco-
nomics, as the cases of works of Ausloos et al. (1999), Stanley et al. (2001) or
Bouchaud (2002), between others. There exist also some works that show an anal-
ogy between nature and economics, which allows to use entropy to study financial
markets (see, in example, Dacorogna, 1999, Ausloos, 1998 or Farmer and Lo, 1999).
Bailey (1990, 1993) introduces the concept of Social Entropy Theory, applying the
concept of entropy to Sociology. In other hand, Chen (2003) uses entropy in a
theory of psychology which as implications in the behaviour of agents that act in
financial markets. More recently the insurance market had attracted the interest
of physics (see Daaroneh 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). It can be concluded that the use
of entropic methods had growing in areas like finances, microeconomics, utility
functions, macroeconomics or even psychology.
The concept of entropy had also been used in election studies. Kirchgässner
and Schimmelpfennig (1992) use it in an indirect form to study electoral partici-
pation. According to some authors, the closeness an election is, more participated
is that election, because electors think that have more decision power. In that
paper, entropy is used as a measure of closeness of results and it should be posi-
tively correlated with electoral participation. Gill (2005) uses entropy as a measure
of uncertainty with the objective of trying to explain voting decision of electors
that eﬀectively vote. Considering the "Contract with America", a document done
by republican in 1994 USA elections, to clarify American’s opinions, Gill (2005)
analyses if such phenomena had changed uncertainty levels of electors, concluding
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that uncertainty is important in their decisions. In other hand, Antweiler (2006)
uses maximum entropy to analyse migration votes in two consecutive elections, to
analyse which electors changed their vote in the first to the second election. This
paper intends to explore the utilization of entropy through politics and election
results, but with diﬀerent objectives. It generalizes interpretation of entropy, con-
sidering it a measure of dissatisfaction and disillusion of populations in relation to
politics, using data for legislative elections1.
Some phenomena like the increase of abstention in a country, consequence of the
dissatisfaction of population and of their alienation in relation to politics could be
detected and analysed. This discontentment could result, for example, in the ap-
pearance of new political parties, with more division of votes and increasing entropy
(result of the discontentment and uncertainty by electors2). Absolute majorities,
while imply less dispersion of votes, are synonym of more confidence in a given
party, making a reduction of entropy.
Electoral results could also be influenced by particular phenomena, like those
terrorist attacks made in vespers of the elections in Spain in 2004, with conse-
quences on the aﬄuence to the polls by electors, and influencing levels of entropy.
Elections’ dates could also influence results: for example, elections on summer sea-
son suﬀer from more abstention. Elections’ results could also be connected with
aspects like safety feeling of citizens, with unpopular socioeconomic policies taken
by government or even with the economic performance of a country. One of the
purposes of this paper is to find these types of phenomena and try to relate them
with the concept of entropy. Another objective is to analyse the reality in diﬀerent
European countries.
Section 2 explains the concept of entropy and how this measure could be related
with electoral abstention. It is also explained how entropy is estimated. Section
3 presents the data used in this paper, while section 4 shows the results of the
relationship between entropy and abstention. In section 5 we present other possible
results which could be obtained with this data: the relationship between abstention
and GDP growth. It is also shown how abstention could help to explain about
pontual facts and also to study the relationship between entropy and opinion polls.
Section 6 compares entropy with other measures of variation and concentration,
namely variance and the Herfindahl concentration index. Section 7 concludes.
2. ENTROPY AND ELECTORAL ABSTENTION
Entropy is a thermodynamics’ concept, linked with the disorder degree of a
state, a concept created by Clausius in 1865. Later, in 1877, Ludwig Boltzmann
defined a probabilistic method to measure entropy. In 20th century, von Neumann
and Shannon worked this concept. In the work that is the foundation of Information
Theory, Shannon (1948) defines entropy as:
H(X) = −
X
pi log pi (1)
1Other methods of physical statistics were applied to election results, although
with other objectives (see, for example, Fortunato and Castellano, 2007, or Filho et
al., 2003).
2 It is based on the interpretation of entropy as a measure of discontentment or disorder that
Bailey (1990, 1993) use this measure in the context of Sociology.
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Shannon’s entropy is a measure of uncertainty which is non-negative3. Zero is
its minimum value, and it is just verified when there exists only one event, when
there is certainty. The maximum entropy value is verified when the distribution is
uniform (pi = 1/ni). Entropy measures total uncertainty of a not known probability
distribution. In the scope of Information Theory, Shannon (1948) uses entropy as
a measure of the amount of information transmitted by a message. Entropy could
be also seen as a measure of randomness of a system.
This measure could also be interpreted as a measure of surprise of a result.
Simply and intuitively, the lower that is the probability of an event, the greater is
the surprise of that event to occur. The value of − log pi, which exemplifies that
surprise, is greater as the probability is lower. So, entropy could be identified as
the average as of how much a person should be surprised for the occurrence of an
event. In the other hand, when uncertainty is greater, greater is the surprise of
occurrence of an event. In this sense, when uncertainty is greater, entropy could be
seen as the ordinal value of information in decisor’s perspective (Dionísio, 2001).
It is also possible to consider entropy, when applied to economics, as an indicator
of eﬃciency, because entropy conservation in time is a consequence of the absence
of changes in resources distribution (Hidalgo, 2006). It is the same to say that
the thermal machine as no movement, or in other words, temperature between two
agents is equal, so it exists eﬃciency4.
Entropy for discrete distributions take its minimum when is certainty about an
event. In terms of elections, it should occur if all electors vote in the same party (or
candidate). The maximum entropy value will occur when we are in the presence of
an uniform probability distribution. Electorally speaking, it means that all parties
(or candidates) have the same number of votes, result of their uncertainty.
In this paper entropy is used for discrete distributions, to analyse the evolution
of electoral results. Although its interpretation of uncertainty, entropy is inter-
preted in this case as a measure of dissatisfaction of electors. In election results
there are no probabilities to use to estimate entropy. However, elections data are
relative frequencies, which verify some of the main properties of probabilities, for
the eﬀect of calculate entropy: pi > 0 and
P
pi = 1. So, the estimation of entropy is
done with vote proportions of each party. Suppose that in a given election there are
three parties, with the following vector of vote proportions: {0, 5; 0, 3; 0, 2}. In this
case, the estimation of entropy following equation 1, would take the value of 1, 0297.
Because in this study the number of parties in the elections of diﬀerent countries is
diﬀerent, it is calculated relative entropy: entropy divided by its maximum value.
Entropy takes it maximum value when we have an uniform distribution. Consid-
ering the same election, when we have three parties, vote proportions would be
{1/3; 1/3; 1/3}. So, entropy would take its maximum value, using equation 1, in
1, 0986, and relative entropy will have the value of 0, 9372.
There exist several studies trying to explain the reason for some electors vote and
others abstain. Downs (1957), in a pioneer work in this research area, identifies the
decision of vote with the fact that the elector has a greater benefit, when comparing
3Equation 1 refers to entropy for discrete distributions. Entropy for continuous distributions
was also defined by Shannon (1948). It presents some diﬀerent propoerties but it is not referred
in this paper because it will not be used.
4Across the time were developed new concepts linked with entropy. One of those concepts is
conditional entropy, the uncertainty of a variable given the knowledge of other variable. Another
related concept is mutual information, a measure that intends to identify similarities between two
distributions. Nowadays it is used in several tests, namely to test dependence between diﬀerent
distributions.
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with the cost of vote, in a similar decision when economic agents decide when they
consume. One of the critics pointed to this analysis is the fact that it couldn’t
explain all what is behind the decision of an elector to vote. It happens because
there are other kinds of motivations, like the civic duty sensation, in the act of vote.
Besides this, the decision of vote could be more related with an investment decision
than with a consumption one, expecting a benefit in the future (see, in example,
Riker and Ordeshook, 1968, and Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983).
Other explanations for the decision to vote are made for models that use a spatial
approach to explain that decision: the grater the proximity between elector’s and
candidates’ opinion, greater is the probability of an elector vote in that candidate.
This type of analysis is done, for example, by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974), Enelow
and Hinich (1981), Paldam and Skott (1995), Kirchgässner (2003) and Gill (2005).
The purpose of this paper is not to make a model of the decision of vote or
abstain, but as it was referred, to relate abstention with entropy, interpreting it as a
measure of dissatisfaction. The question here is: should it be possible to use entropy
as a measure of dissatisfaction of electors? In the particular case of USA elections,
Gill (2005) refers that there exists a great complexity in the elections. It happens
because candidates present a vague speech, letting some uncertainty in electors.
Besides this, the lack of knowledge of electoral programs and the lack of time of
electors to analyse them could make a contribution to create that uncertainty. The
existence of asymmetric information, according to the same author, could conduct
some electors to think that the best alternative is to not vote (see also Enelow
and Hinich, 1981 and Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997). So, and according to Gill
(2005), if some electors vote and others do not, this is due to diﬀerent levels of
uncertainty of electors.
At an aggregate level, Blais et al. (2003) try to identify what are the factors that
have influence in the electoral participation, covering 151 elections in 61 diﬀerent
countries. GDP per capita is one of those variables, showing a positive impact in
participation. Also the dimension of population contributes to turnout, but in a
negative form: countries with more population have less relative turnout. Electoral
systems that allow votation through alternative ways (mail, in advance or by proxy)
and that have compulsory vote (penalizing those that do not vote) present also
more relative participation in elections. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) also
identify the reduction of vote barriers as a potential variable which could raise
turnout. In other hand, in the specific context of american elections, Abramson
and Aldrich (1982) found evidence that, even with more registration facility and
with the increase of education, turnout in USA, between 1966 and 1980 decreased.
Other factors, like dissatisfaction and the non identification with political parties
are explanations for that phenomenon.
About the personal decision of vote or abstain, the motives are obviously oth-
ers. Palfam and Skott (1995) and Kirchgässner (2003) refer that political parties
gain votes if, in the electors’ view, they are visibly diﬀerent between them. So,
one possible explanation for abstention is the belief of electors that political parties
have no qualitative diﬀerent solutions, synonymous of dissatisfaction. Or, in other
hand, that political parties present promises that they successively do not fulfill.
Santo (2005) cites Georges Vedel5 aﬃrming that one possible reason to the increase
of abstention, in the case of France, is the depolitization, which can also be inter-
preted as a signal of population’s dissatisfaction. Citing Freire and Magalhães6,
5Vedel, G. (1962), La Dépolitisation: Mythe ou Réalité?, Paris, Libraire Armand Colin.
6Freire, A. e P. Magalhães, 2002, A Abstenção Eleitoral em Portugal, Lisboa, Instituto de
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Santo (2005) refers that abstention could be understood as a temporary attitude
of dissatisfaction in relation to the political system and inclusively as a lack of
confidence7. The lack of confidence and depolitization, associated with the weak-
ening of party identification, had been pointed by Abramson and Aldrich (1982)
as possible explanations for the decrease of turnout, in the specific case of USA.
The same authors point the declining beliefs about government responsiveness as
another reason for the increase of abstention.
Note the particular case of Portugal, a country that suﬀered some decades with
a dictatorship, that ended in 1974. In the following year, Portugal had the first
free elections after dictatorship8. Left recently of a disturbed period of its history,
it was natural that electors wanted to show their desire to decide country’s way,
and voted about 92% of inscribe electors9 . In terms of electoral results, if electors
believe that democracy works, it is expected that the turnout levels doesn’t change
dramatically. However, if for any motive people do not believe in the political class,
or if exists dissatisfaction, it is expected that abstention increases.
The value of entropy decreased in Portuguese elections through 1980, signal of
the decrease of uncertainty by electors. It could be concluded that exists some
credibilization of politicians. The coalition of centre-right, which won 1979 and
1980 elections could helped for this. However, that coalition finished after mis-
understand, and separated. That fact contributed for a more dispersion of votes,
increasing entropy in the following elections, in periods marked for some political
instability in the country and also economic problems (it coincides with two periods
of less GDP growth).
In the following elections, entropy decreased. There were more stable years,
both in political and economic terms, also related with the entrance of Portugal
to European Economic Community. This phenomena helped to decrease electors’
uncertainty, in two votations that resulted in to absolute majorities and with gov-
ernments that finished their four years mandates. Since then, electoral results show
a growing level of entropy, just broken by a slight decrease in 2002. This is a point
when Portuguese population feels dissatisfacted with politicians and when political
parties present some weakness and sign of division. This is well-known with the
appearance of movements of independent citizens in autarquic elections10, or with
the division of a major party supporting two diﬀerent candidates for presidential
elections. Besides this, parties with less votation in previous elections, started to
gain some weight, having inclusively seat in the Parliament.
Since the first elections in 1974 to the last in 2005, the level of abstention
in Portugal presents a growing trend, worrying for political class, and could be
interpreted as an uncredibility indicator of populations. The lack of confidence in
the political system is also identified as a problem in the country, by Vargas (2002).
Also the Spanish case could help to understand better the relationship between
entropy and abstention, namely the events happened in 2004 elections. In that
year, in the days before the elections, occurred the terrorist attacks of March 11th,
that could changed the course of the results. The majority of opinion polls in
Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa.
7Bailey (1983) refers that maximum entropy is the "system death" (page 114). The increase
of entropy, in the context of elections and interpreted as social dissatisfaction shouldn’t mean
the "death of democracy" but sould be analysed by politicans as a problem, like the increase of
abstention.
8All the elections considered in this paper are legislative elections.
9Data for portuguese elections are obtained in Comissão Nacional de Eleições (www.cne.pt)
10 In 2005, a total of 7 municipalities were won by independent candidatures, all over the country.
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that year indicated a victory of Popular Party (PP), even it was not an absolute
majority11 . However, after the attacks and after wrong accusations (remember that
PP government blamed ETA for the attacks when the true attacks were made by
extremist Islamic groups), results were diﬀerent from those that opinion polls point.
In this case, the dissatisfaction with a particular political party made that electors
had more certains in relation to the opposition party, changing the direction of
results of opinion polls, at the same time that turnout increased.
It is based on these arguments that entropy is interpreted as a measure of
dissatisfaction for the political system in general. So, it is possible to analyse if
entropy is related with abstention.
3. DATA
Abstention is a phenomenon that occurs in all countries of the world and has
been studied for several occasions. In this paper abstention is analysed for 16 Euro-
pean countries: Italy, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany,
Belgium, France, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Greece, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland
and Denmark. The study starts with elections after II World War. First, because
it is a mark on the world history. Second because is from this date that data is
more frequent.
Austria, Finland, France, Norway, United Kingdom and Denmark were the
countries of this analysis the first to have elections in post-II World War, in 1945;
in the following year were the elections of the Netherlands and Belgium12; 1947 was
the year of elections in Switzerland, followed by Italy, Sweden and Ireland in 1948
and Germany in 1949; Greece, Portugal and Spain have a shorter time analysis
because their first free elections were, respectively, in 1974, 1975 and 1977. Table 1
indicates the first and the last year of the analysis, as well as the number of elections
in each country. It is also indicated data source for each country, normally sites of
oﬃcial pages of elections in each country13. Just legislative elections were consid-
ered. Following Santo (2005), the context of the election (if it is national, regional,
European, presidential, etc.) could have influence in the level of abstention. So it
is necessary to choose similar elections for countries.
In terms of the evolution analysis we found that the levels of abstention increased
for almost all the countries studied in our data sample. This growing trend just
not occurs in Spain, Norway and Denmark. In the cases of Germany, Belgium
and Sweden, until half of sample, abstention had decreased. From that time to
nowadays, they have the same increasing path. The evolution of abstention can be
analysed in Figure 1.
We use proportions of vote for the most voted parties to estimate discrete en-
tropy. The number of parties used in each country, for the estimation of entropy,
diﬀers between countries but, in the same country, the number of parties is always
the same. To make comparisons between diﬀerent countries, and since entropy is
sensitive in relation to the number of categories (parties) used for the analysis, it
was calculated the relative entropy (HR): the ratio between entropy (H) and its
11See, for example, www.libertaddigital.com/suplementos/elecciones2004/encuestas.html or
www.lapaginadefinitiva.com/politica/elecciones2004/escopetas.htm
12The first election used in Belgium was just the election of 1949, because it was the first with
universal suﬀrage.
13For some electios, in the absence of information about abstention, these data was recovered
from www.idea.int/vt/.
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Country 1st elec-
tion
Last elec-
tion
N. of elec-
tions
Source
Ita 1948 2008 16 elezionistorico.interno.it
Spa 1977 2008 10 www.elecciones.mir.es
Por 1975 2005 12 www.cne.pt
UK 1945 2005 17 www.election.demon.co.uk
Net 1946 2006 19 www.kiesraad.nl
Ger 1949 2005 16 www.bundeswahlleiter.de
Bel 1949 2007 19 www.ibzdgip.fgov.be
Fra 1945 2007 18 www.interieur.gouv.fr
Nor 1945 2005 16 www.regjeringen.no
Swe 1948 2006 19 www.val.se
Fin 1945 2007 18 statfin.stat.fi
Gre 1974 2007 12 www.ypes.gr
Swi 1947 2007 16 www.parties-and-
elections.de
Aut 1945 2006 19 www.bmi.gv.at
Ire 1948 2007 18 electionsireland.org
Den 1945 2007 25 www.ft.dk
TABLE 1
Number of elections for each country
maximum value (HM) - HR = H/HM .The criterion used to choose the number of
categories in each country is related with the number of parties most voted, in the
first considered election. The objective was that, at the beginning of the sample,
the proportion of the category "Others" shouldn’t exceed 10%. It allows to see, for
example, the relevance and the evolution of this category. An increase in its value
means that exists more dispersion on votes, being a clear indicator of global uncer-
tainty by electors in relation to their political opinions, which will increase entropy.
While there exist countries where this category decreased (the case of Spain, that
could be related with the particular event of terrorist attacks in the days before
the elections in 2004 and 2008), others are where that category is, inclusively, the
most important one (the case, for example, of Belgium, where in the first election it
had a residual weight of 1% and, in 2007, after considered the first six parties, the
value of "Others" corresponded to about 24% of the votes). Excluding the cases
of Germany, Spain and Portugal, all other countries show a trend, more or less
evident, of increase in that category, in spite of the cases of Italy, Switzerland and
Denmark where that value had decreased in the last elections. The behaviour of
the category "Others" could be seen, for the diﬀerent countries, in Figure 2.
4. RESULTS
Entropy is frequently used as a measure of uncertainty. In this paper it is used
to analyse electoral processes, interpreting it as a measure of uncertainty of electors
for politics in general. It could be considered as a measure of dissatisfaction and
disillusion in relation to politics. As referred previously, electors’ dissatisfaction
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FIG. 1 Evolution of abstention.
is caused, according to some authors, by the weakening of the interest for politics
and has a consequence on the decreasing of turnout, increasing abstention. In this
sense, entropy should be positively correlated with abstention which means that,
the greater the dissatisfaction of electors, abstention will take higher values (see,
for example, Santo, 2005 or Abramson and Aldrich, 1982). Individual results, for
each of sixteen countries in analysis, could be seen in Table 2. Those values refers
to the correlation between relative entropy and abstention, for country.
From the analysis of all countries in this database, just four have diﬀerent cor-
relation coeﬃcients from expected: Portugal, France, Finland and Denmark. From
these countries, just the French case is significant at 5% level. The coeﬃcient of
Portugal, besides taking a relatively high value (inclusively greater in absolute value
when compared with the french coeﬃcient), is not significant at 5%.
For the countries that present positive coeﬃcients, more than half are significant:
Italy, United Kingdom and Norway, at 5% level and Germany, Switzerland, Austria
and Ireland at 1% level. Our results show a strong support for what is proposed in
this paper: abstention is related with uncertainty of electors, measured by entropy.
Considering that any country have a sample greater than twenty elections, results
could be considered encouraging. The graphical representation of the diﬀerent
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countries, considering these two variables, could be seen at Figure 3.
If one of the problems could be the small dimension of the samples in some
countries, it is interesting to verify what happens we aggregate data from diﬀerent
countries, making just one sample. Because for the estimation of entropy were
used diﬀerent number of categories for countries, it was estimated a comparative
measure. It was calculated the level of relative entropy (HR = H/HM), a measure
that is greater than 0 and smaller than 1 and indicates the relationship of the value
of entropy in each election and its maximum value, in the case of all categories
have the same vote proportion. As the level of abstention is completely diﬀerent
for countries, it was done the calculus of abstention per capita, to make possible an
international comparison between data14.
The sample recovered has a total of 270 elections. Estimating the correlation co-
eﬃcient between relative entropy and the respective level of abstention per capita,
the observed value is 0, 2971, statistically significant. It is concluded that, besides
results have some support for individual analysis, the same happens when aggre-
gated data is considered. Figure 4 represents this relationship.
14Abstention per capita represents the value of percentage of abstention for million inhabitants.
A similar indicator to this is used in Strömberg (2004).
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Country Correlation between entropy and abstention
Ita 0,5927*
Spa 0,2031
Por -0,5610
UK 0,5490*
Net 0,1884
Ger 0,8072**
Bel 0,1290
Fra -0,5130*
Nor 0,5160*
Swe 0,0390
Fin -0,0279
Gre 0,3092
Swi 0,6859**
Aut 0,8397**
Ire 0,7032**
Den -0,3800
TABLE 2
Individual results of correlation between entropy and abstention. ** significant at
5% level. * significant at 1% level.
Entropy had been already used previously to analyse its relationship with turnout.
Kirchgässner and Schimmelpfennig (1992) defend that, how much electors think
that election’s result is close, greater is their probability to decide to vote, because
they consider their vote with capacity to be decisive. As elections with closer results
mean higher levels of entropy, authors find evidence for United Kingdom and West
Germany (elections in both countries in 1983 and 1987) for a positive relationship
between entropy and turnout.
This paper presents entropy as a measure of dissatisfaction, positively correlated
with abstention and, so, negatively correlated with turnout, contradicting previous
results. A possible explanation could be related with the reduced number used by
Kirchgässner and Schimmelpfennig (1992), besides it uses information for several
regional electoral circles. Another possible explanation is that entropy, as it was
estimated, is a measure calculated after elections. The factors that can have influ-
ence in the decision of vote by electors, according to the authors, is their belief that
elections will have close results, and these are data supplied not by final results but
by pre-electoral opinion polls.
5. OTHER POSSIBLE FACTS TO ANALYSE
Besides the relationship between abstention and entropy, the data of this paper
could be used to analyse other kind of questions. In this section is analysed the
possible relationship between abstention and GDP growth, the eﬀect of specific
and unexpected events during the electoral period and to analyse the relationship
between opinion polls and electors uncertainty.
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FIG. 3 Relative entropy and abstention.
5.1. Abstention and GDP growth
Some authors, like Blais et al. (2003), refer that turnout could be positively
related with the level of growth in a country. In this paper it was made an analysis
of this kind of relationships, first making the relationship between growth rate
and abstention and that the relationship between growth rate and abstention per
capita15 . Besides of the fact that results do not show such a good verification like
those between abstention and entropy, some conclusions could be retrieved. The
relationship between growth rate, abstention and abstention per capita is in the
Table 3. The expected relation between these variables is a negative one: higher
levels of growth should make abstention to be lower, because countries with greater
growth rates have tendency to have more informed and interested citizens in politics
(Blais et al., 2003).
In this case, results do not have such support as expected. Using abstention,
and besides the majority of countries show the expected sign of correlation (eleven
in sixteen countries), just four have significant results: Italy, Austria, Denmark
(all with 5% of significance) and Switzerland (1% of significance). This could be
caused by the few number of observations in samples. Six countries present positive
15The growth rate used is the average growth between two consecutive elections.
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FIG. 4 Relative entropy and abstention per capita.
correlation levels (Spain, United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden, Greece and Ireland),
but none is statistically significant, using the usual levels of significance.
When it is made the same analysis using abstention per capita, results are
somehow diﬀerent. Just five countries show positive correlation (Spain, United
Kingdom, France Sweden and Ireland), but none is significant. The remaining
countries show the expected correlation signal and five of them are significant:
Denmark, Austria, Belgium and Italy with 5% of significance, and Switzerland,
with 2% (Greece shows a level of correlation close to be significant at a level of
5%). The relationship between abstention per capita and GDP growth rate, for
each country, could be seen in Figure 5.
While analysing countries individually show some support for the expected re-
lationship between these two variables, when data is aggregated that verification
vanish. Using the results of growth rate and abstention per capita for all countries,
we obtain a correlation coeﬃcient of 0, 1174, in a total of 214 observations. The
diﬀerences between this result and the correlation between entropy and abstention
could be related with two diﬀerent motives. First, the number of observations is
smaller, once data used to calculate growth rates, sourced by IFM, are less nu-
merous. Figure 6 shows the relationship between abstention per capita and GDP
growth rate, using aggregated data.
Second, and maybe more important, is the fact that in this study are just
used countries with degrees of economic development relatively high. The study of
Blais et al. (2003) uses an heterogeneous group of 61 countries and from diﬀerent
continents. For those heterogeneous group GDP could be relevant. In this case,
probably this is not the most important variable.
5.2. Specific events
It is usual to say that some events have the ability to change the elections’
results. Is this true? At least in the case of Spain it seem to be. The electoral
campaign in 2004 was coming to end, with opinion polls indicating a victory for
Popular Party (PP), when happened the terrorist attacks of 11th March in Madrid.
The PP government accused ETA to have the responsability for the attacks, when
they were made by Islamic groups. After this, the electoral results were completely
diﬀerent from opinion polls, giving a clear victory for the Socialist Party (PSOE).
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Country Correlation between GDP
growth and abstention
Correlation between GDP
growth and abstention per
capita
N
Ita -0,7604* -0,7449* 10
Spa 0,3158 0,1312 9
Por -0,4018 -0,3682 11
UK 0,1290 0,1524 15
Net -0,1445 -0,0782 15
Ger -0,0645 -0,0238 12
Bel 0,4716 -0,5303* 16
Fra -0,2683 0,0362 14
Nor -0,3453 -0,2117 10
Swe 0,3120 0,36976 17
Fin -0,4250 -0,4248 13
Gre 0,5089 -0,5936 11
Swi -0,7429** -0,7316** 15
Aut -0,5604 -0,5544* 13
Ire 0,4455 0,0448 17
Den -0,5555* -0,5729* 16
TABLE 3
Individual results for correlations between growth and abstention and between
growth and abstention per capita. ** significant at 5% level. * significant at 1%
level.
This particular phenomena was the base of the work of Gassebner et al. (2008).
Based on theretical approaches of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), and with the
hypothesis that "Terrorism increases the probability that the incumbent govern-
ment is replaced an the next election", they conclude that the existence of terrorist
attacks and, in particular, their severity, have an eﬀective impact in the decision
of electors of change the government. This happens because national security is
regarded has an extremely important public good and, when occure severe terrorist
attacks, they are seen as a failure of governments.
In the particurar case of the Spanish election of 2004, electors showed his cer-
tainty to punish the PP, at the same time that turnout increased. How can be
entropy used to analyse this particular event? As referred previously, entropy is
a measure of uncertainty and could be interpreted as a measure of dissatisfac-
tion facing politics in general. As data show, the relationship between abstention
and entropy is high. So, how much electors are dissatisfacted with political par-
ties, there is a less turnout. Before the attacks, there was no reason to think
that elections would not have a normal behaviour. At the last day that opinion
polls were published in Spain, four diﬀerent organizations presented their results
(IPSOS-ECO, SIGMA-DOS, Instituto Opina and Demoscopia). Just in the first one
PSOE was the winning party. The results of the polls, in terms of entropy, were
{1, 2136; 1, 1871; 1, 2182; 1, 1993}16. The entropy of the electoral results is 1, 1787.
16 In this case, entropy was estimated transforming the proportion of the number of deputies
indicated by polls. As the proportion of deputies is not equal to the proportion of votes, to
compare the results of polls with the electoral result, the entropy of this was also estimating with
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FIG. 5 Relation between abstention per capita and GDP growth rate.
It is confirmed that entropy decreased, in relation to all parties. Besides this, it was
made a test to the means of the four polls. Under the null hypothesis that the mean
is equal to 1, 1787 (the result of elections), and even with just four observations, the
null hypothesis is rejected at the level of 5%, meaning that mean of polls is diﬀerent
from the result eﬀectively done by the elections. Even doing a bilateral test, the
evidence is that the average of the opinion polls is greater than the average of the
elections, concluding that entropy decreased.
What is possible to conclude? That electors showed unhappy with what hap-
pened with the government party and mobilized to vote in PSOE. Could be made
the following question: isn’t entropy being interpreted as a dissatisfaction indica-
tor? Apparently yes, but an indicator of dissatisfaction facing to politics in general.
In this case, the reducion of entropy is due to the dissatisfaction with a particular
party.
5.3. Opinion polls.
Other question could be made now: are the results of opinion polls misleading?
Or, in average, they give the true result of intentions of electors? Unfortunately, we
those data.
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FIG. 6 Relation between abstention per capita and GDP growth for aggregated
data.
have not available data for opinion polls for all countries. However, it was possible
to find 147 diﬀerent opinion polls17 . Estimating the relative entropy of poll’s results,
and calculating its average, we made making the usual test of equality of means and
we did not reject the hypothesis of equality. So, with a level of 5% of significance,
there is evidence than the average of the relative entropy of polls opinion (0, 8308)
is not statistically diﬀerent from the relative entropy of the results (0, 8246). It can
be concluded that, normally, surveys do not present statistically diﬀerent results, in
terms of entropy, from that there are shown by elections. This demonstrates that
entropy could be used to detect what happens caused by unexpected events that
change in the uncertainty level of citizens, as seen in the previous section.
6. COMPARING DIFFERENT MEASURES
Besides entropy, there are other measures traditionally used to measure un-
certainty, variability and concentration. The measure of variability most used is
variance, which could be also interpreted as a measure of uncertainty.
Supposing, once again, that we have an election with three political parties
with the following vector of vote proportions {0, 5; 0, 3; 0, 2}. In this case, the
estimated variance is given by 0, 03. For the same motive that was used the relative
entropy, it was also used the relative variance: the ration between variance and
maximum variance. Once again, maximum variance is estimating using an uniform
176 polls for italian elections in 2008 (http://alessandroingegno.wordpress.com) and one for
the 2006 election (http://www.repubblica.it); 3 polls for spanish elections in 2008 and 4 for 2004
(http://es.wikipedia.org); 7 polls for portuguese elections of 2005 (http://www.marktest.com),
1 for 2002 (http://dossiers.publico.clix.pt/noticia.aspx?idCanal=317&id=73771), 6 for elec-
tions of 1999, 7 for 1995 and 6 for 1991 (http://margensdeerro.blogspot.com); for Sweden,
in 2006 were obtained data for 25 polls of 5 diﬀerent organisms(Synovate Temo, Sifo,
Skop, Ruab, Demoskop), since the beggining of September, with the elections taking place
on 17th Setembro (http://www.temo.se/upload/326/valjbsamtliga.htm) and for 2002 were
taken data for 47 polls from 1st September to 14th September, the day before the elec-
tion (http://www.temo.se/upload/326/valjbsamtliga2000_sep2002.htm); for Greece, in 2007,
have reults of 13 polls (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_legislative_election%2C_2007);
for the Netherlands it was collected one poll (http://www.politiekebarometer.nl/);
for Austria were collected data from 12 polls in the month before elections
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_legislative_election%2C_2006); in France were col-
lected 9 polls (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_legislative_election%2C_2007).
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HR V AR_R HHR Abstpc
HR 1 0,6726** -0,978** 0,2907**
V AR_R 1 -0,6175** 0,1535*
HHR 1 -0,2661**
Abstpc 1
TABLE 4
Comparison of diﬀerent measures. ** significant at 5% level. * significant at 1%
level.
vote vector, given by {1/3; 1/3; 1/3}. So, maximum variance should be 0, 0370, and
relative variance would be 0, 82.
Another index broadly used to measure concentration drifts from industrial
economics: Herfindahl concentration index, given by 2.
HH =
X
p2i (2)
With a vote proportion vector equal to {0, 5; 0, 3; 0, 2}, Herfindahl index will take
the value of 0, 38. Once again, because diﬀerent countries use diﬀerent numbers
of categories (parties), it was calculated the relative Herfindahl index, given by
equation 3. In this case, the value would be 0, 07.
HHR =
¡
HH − 1N
¢
1− 1N
(3)
It were calculated correlations between the following variables: relative entropy
(HR), relative variance (V AR_R), relative Herfindahl index (HHR) and absten-
tion per capita (Abstpc). Results could be seen at Table 4.
It could be seen a strong significant correlation between those three measures.
The relationship between relative entropy and relative variance takes a positive
value of 0, 6726. Eﬀectively, these are measures that have the same intention: both
could be considered uncertainty and variability measures. Comparing the perfor-
mance of both measures with abstention (measured per capita), relative entropy
has stronger results: in spite of both variables present a significant correlation,
significance is stronger for relative entropy.
When compared with Herfindahl index (HHR), entropy presents a significant
correlation. As it was expected, that correlation is negative: while entropy is a mea-
sure of uncertainty and dispersion, Herfindahl index is a measure of concentration.
As expected, the correlation between HHR and abstention per capita is negative.
In absolute terms, relative entropy shows stronger correlation with abstention per
capita, when compared with relative variance.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper has the objective of extend the use of entropy in elections. Being
entropy a measure of uncertainty, it can be seen as a measure of dissatisfaction of
electors in relation to politics in general. We expect that when the dissatisfaction
of electors is higher, the turnout will be lower and, consequently, abstention will be
higher.
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The relation ship between abstention and entropy was obtained and, for 12 of
the 16 countries of the sample, results present the expected signal of the coeﬃcient,
and 7 from these are significant. Just Portugal, Finland, Denmark and France have
negative coeﬃcients, and just the last one is significant. When this coeﬃcient is
calculated with grouped data, the result is statistical significant.
Then, it were identified another facts. According to some authors, it is ex-
pected that abstention should be negatively correlated with GDP. Calculating the
correlation between abstention and growth rate, grouped results present a positive
correlation, contrary to the expected, but statistically non-significant. However,
when individual countries are considered, the unique results that are significant
point to the expected negative relationship.
Entropy could also be used, in this context, to try to explain some events. It is
what happens with Spain, where the terrorist attacks of 11th March 2004 changed
the vote intention of electors and that it is significantly diﬀerent from surveys. As
opinion polls do not diﬀer from the average of election results, it is concluded that
entropy could also explain some specific events occurred during the electoral period.
Finally, it were compared three diﬀerent measures normally used to measure
dispersion and concentration: entropy, variance and Herfindahl index, all in rela-
tive terms. The first two measures presented, between them, a close relation. When
compared with abstention, both in absolute and per capita terms, relative entropy
has stronger results. Relative entropy shows an inverse relation, as expected, with
the Herfindahl index. However, both measures present similar qualitative results
when compared with abstention: how greater is abstention, it could be seen as dis-
satisfaction of populations but also has a positive correlation with electoral results.
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